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Along our life, we acquire most of our beliefs through testimony. Certainly, the only 
way of having access to many facts is through other people’s words. Testimonial be-
liefs are widespread. Moreover, we feel extremely confident in some of these beliefs, 
and some of them amount to knowledge or, at least, we take them to be highly justi-
fied for us. We could not view ourselves as deprived of this very wide net of beliefs 
acquired through the testimony of other persons. Hence testimonies can’t be consid-
ered as dispensable. But this uncontroversial fact does not address the epistemological 
question about whether the beliefs so acquired are justified (or amount to knowledge) 
by testimony, that is, by the very fact that the testifier makes available to the hearer a 
true proposition in an appropriate way. 
 Since the very beginning of modern epistemology, testimony has been much ques-
tioned as a valuable source of knowledge. Its epistemic import seemed to derive mere-
ly from the acceptance of authorities. And how could we be justified in our beliefs 
when they are grounded exclusively on the authority of other’s words? The last years 
have seen a revival in the interest for testimony within the epistemological literature. 
But now testimony does not just raise classical questions about the justification of our 
beliefs or the subject’s rational grounds for accepting the deliverances of our basic 
sources of belief; it also suggests new issues about the role of the individual knower in 
communicative and social settings or the special responsibility the knowers seem to 
exhibit in a testimonial situation. This monograph aims to broaden the range of topics 
recently discussed regarding the role and value of testimony in the acquisition of 
knowledge. Understandably, we do not intend to be exhaustive. The main interest of 
the participants in this volume is centered on how testimony works in communicative 
settings as an authoritative source of knowledge. 
 How the communicative context intervenes in the acquisition of knowledge by tes-
timony is addressed in the papers by Gloria Origgi (“Trust, authority and epistemic re-
sponsibility”) and Paula Olmos (“Situated practices of testimony. A rethorical ap-
proach”). The paper by Origgi tries to link the pragmatics of the communicative inter-
actions with the acceptance of testimonial knowledge. She argues that it is the sharing 
of a communicative context and a practice of interpretation that explains how infor-
mant and receiver of information can share epistemic responsibilities. Testimony de-
rives its epistemic significance from the interplay between the credibility attributed to 
authorities and the dynamics of interpretation of what they say and we could come to 
believe. Epistemic reponsibilities of both speaker and hearer depend on evaluating the 
effects of relevance in the communicative context and the adoption of an stance of 
trust. 
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 Paula Olmos’ paper also addresses these issues now within the rethorical tradition. 
She proposes, through the study of formal practices of testimony, to distinguish two 
phases in a testimonial process: the disclosure of information by the speaker and how 
the audience gives authority to the testimony. Authority is analyzed in terms of the us-
ability of this testimony in the game of asking for and giving reasons. Even what is 
said is shaped by expectations about possible uses of the information. The rethorical 
tradition teaches us about how the inherited material is put into use in many different 
contextual settings and treated as a source of authoritative knowledge. Olmos pleads 
for a change of perspective in the epistemological study of testimony, from the ideal 
and individualist model implicit in classical epistemology to a more communitarian 
and discoursive approach, a more interactive model and a contextualized conception 
of the dynamics and use of testimonial information. 
 One of the hardest questions in current epistemology concerns whether we should 
view knowledge as an essentially individual accomplishment or as social in character. 
One of the common assumptions in the papers here collected is that testimony must 
lie at the core of a social epistemology without renouncing the autonomy of the indi-
vidual subject. In a sense, testimony is halfway between the prospects of an individual-
ist epistemology and the promises of a social epistemology. On the one hand, defend-
ers of testimony as a mechanism for the generation and/or the transmission of 
knowledge do not desire to give up the centrality of the knower as normatively en-
gaged in the task of assessing his rational resources. On the other hand, normative re-
quirements involved in testimonial situations are not limited to individual commitments 
and evaluations. Putatively, testimony cannot exhibit its own normative status without 
taking into account the social interaction in which testifiers and receivers of the testi-
mony are engaged. In a sense, the papers collected in this volume attempt to over-
come the tensions between these two aspects and place the autonomous epistemic 
agent in a context of cooperative and social exchanges in order to explain the episte-
mological significance of testimony. 
 Testimony is a sort of cooperative behaviour in which the informational interests 
of the interlocutors are put into play. This could be presented as a social dilemma, 
such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, potentially confronting the interests of speaker and 
hearer. But successful testimony is better considered as a form of conversational co-
operation that becomes an achievement of both speakers. The papers by Paul Faulkner 
(“Cooperation and trust in conversational exchanges”) and Fernando Broncano (“Trust-
ing others. The epistemological authority of testimony”) aim to state the principles of 
cooperative behaviour that testimonial acts exemplify. Faulkner argues for a Gricean 
way to escape the dilemma, that is, by considering that both interlocutors have the 
presumption that, given the conversational situation, the other will cooperate. Both 
speakers recognize the dependence that testimony involves and they react in a trust-
worthy way. The trusted party, by seeing this dependence, argues Faulkner, have a suf-
ficient a reason to be trustworthy.  
 Very similarly to this mechanism of recognizing the epistemic dependence, Bron-
cano considers cooperative behavior in testimony as a case of joint action that claims a 
positive assent from the speakers to the end of sharing knowledge. Being conscious of 
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the epistemically asymmetrical perspective in which they are placed, both parties take 
their responsibilities in this joint action. In both papers, cooperation would therefore 
be a basic dimension built in the very mechanism of testimony. In testimonial situa-
tions other epistemic agents intervene, not just as instruments the hearer uses in order 
to get some belief, or even a true belief, but as willed persons that are engaged in mu-
tual responsibilities. This very fact brings up new possible sources of error, not pre-
sent in the acquisition of beliefs by other mechanisms. Other’s insincerity can be al-
leged, besides unreliability, as starting point for raising skeptical threats. Again, in what 
sense testimony is social and how the knower as knower is involved in the testimonial 
situation are essential to account for the peculiarities of this kind of knowledge acqui-
sition. 
 Less attention is paid in this volume to one of the issues that have shaped the 
literature on testimony in the last two decades, that is, the confrontation between non-
reductionism and reductionism regarding the justification of our testimonial beliefs. 
Reductionism claims that the justification a testimonial belief exhibits can be reduced 
to the epistemic work of other more basic sources. Non-reductionism defends, on the 
contrary, that there is a specific epistemic contribution of testimony in the justification 
of the beliefs acquired and thus it can be included among the basic sources of justified 
beliefs. Almost all the contributions included in this volume attempt to remain equi-
distant between these two options. This issue is considered not so crucial with respect 
to the authority of testimony as other questions regarding the nature of testimony it-
self. Perhaps the contrast is not even essential for answering the normative question. 
In a sense, it is not difficult to agree that, in accepting a belief on the basis of other’s 
words, the acceptance should be balanced against other sources of knowledge; or that 
other rational considerations must be in place in accepting a testimonial belief; and 
that maybe we do not accept a testimonial belief just on the basis of others’ words, in a 
decontextualized setting. But at once, we should also be inclined to accept that testi-
mony as such makes a specific contribution to the normative status of our beliefs. Noth-
ing seems then to require the incompatibility of both ideas. 
 Nevertheless, the confrontation between reductionists and non-reductionists does 
affect central questions discussed in the papers of this volume. In a certain sense, the 
non-reductionist seems to assume that the epistemic work made by hearer and speaker 
is radically different, because whereas the speaker contributes positively to the cor-
rectness of the belief, the hearer contributes just negatively by not detecting any de-
featers for the proposition that the speaker’s words convey. Some of the contributors 
(Broncano, Faulkner, Origgi, Vega) to this volume wish to make room to a more posi-
tive work by the hearer regardless of whether one accepts a reductionist or a non-
reductionist account of the justifiedness of testimonies. Epistemic competences and 
virtues of the hearer are also involved in the cooperative situation created within a 
communicative setting in which both participants take themselves as engaged in a so-
cial and informational exchange. 
 Authors pay attention as well to the special kind of interdependence created 
among the participants in a testimonial situation. For what is at stake is the epistemic 
dimension characterizing this interdependence. And some of the papers (again Bron-
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cano, Faulkner, Origgi, Vega) appeal to the notion of trust in accounting for this 
specificity. The hearer depends on the speaker just because she trusts him; and the 
speaker assumes certain burdens just because he recognizes that the acceptance of 
what he says is grounded on an attitude of trust.  
 But how trust can have any epistemological significance? Many epistemologists are 
skeptics about trust contributing to the epistemic status of a belief. Here the contrast 
between different positions seems to grow from the different significance given to 
evidential and non-evidential factors in the acquisition of beliefs by testimony. Recent 
literature has emphasized that tellings should not be taken as indicators (or evidence) 
in order to play a significant epistemic role in the acceptance by the hearer. But the 
question is: how could these tellings, while they do not work as evidence, count at 
once as reasons for the hearer to believe that p? Trust could play a role in how tellings 
act as reasons for the hearer’s belief. So it is suggested by some of the papers. Trust 
refers to the exhibited attitudes in many ordinary contexts where people engage with 
others in personal relations that ground cooperative situations. It has been argued that 
trust attitudes necessarily involve some vulnerability that cannot be overcome by gath-
ering evidences without at the same time annihilating the very attitude of trust. But 
how can situations where uncertainty cannot be eliminated nor “domesticated” by es-
timations of probability be epistemically relevant? In other words, it is not easy to ex-
plain how trust could make an epistemic significant contribution to the acceptance of a 
belief. Let us explain. For trust to be epistemically significant, we seem to have only 
two options available: first, trust could be a very special way of envisaging the evi-
dence for belief; second, trust is alien to any evidential consideration. But if we follow 
the first path, and trust is explained in evidential terms, there is nothing epistemically 
specific in the explanatory model that appeals to the specificity of trust. And the sec-
ond option has not a clear epistemological interpretation. What kind of epistemic rea-
sons are available to the person that places his trust by trusting the speaker? And if it 
is epistemically significant, in what sense the reasons trust provides belong to a differ-
ent kind? These questions claim to account for how epistemically rational trust is pos-
sible. 
 One possibility explored in some of the papers is to consider trust as an affective 
response in concrete communicative situations. Testimony seems to inherit a kind of 
rational responsiveness from this attitude of trust that is constitutive of our sociality. It 
is even the fact of creating a situation of vulnerability for the trusting person that con-
stitutes the special reason to be trustworthy and cooperate. That means again that tes-
timonial contexts cannot be understood without taking into account our character as 
persons engaged in a cooperative epistemic task. So testimony exhibits necessarily a 
moral dimension. In some epistemic practices, one cannot be dispensed from viewing 
them as ethically constrained. On the one hand, testimony creates obligations and re-
sponsibilities in the participants that are both epistemic and ethical. On the other 
hand, this perspective on the issues helps to identify social situations where some 
wrongs are viewed as specific forms of epistemic injustice. There are some epistemic 
wrongs linked to the testimonial situations in which the hearers, for instance, are de-
prived of credibility. This is the central question in Miranda Fricker’s book Epistemic In-
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justice. The book is devoted to the significance of social and ethical aspects in the epis-
temology of testimony. So we have considered that the inclusion in this monograph of 
a short symposion on the book could be of interest (the discussion was held in almost 
these terms during the conference that gave rise to this volume). The debate deals 
with a very important consequence of taking testimony as a topic of social epistemol-
ogy. Fricker’s idea is that testimony confronts us with the social role of hearer. Some-
times testimony is biased due to some trait of the speaker, not attending sufficiently to 
the transmitted content, and this constitutes —this is Fricker’s proposal— a case of 
epistemic injustice. This important remark is discussed from two very different points 
of view by Francisco J. Gil and Jesús Zamora. Gil argues from a Kantian tradition and 
demands some clarifications about how Fricker could integrate the Kantian maxims 
on autonomy into her theory of testimony. Zamora, in his turn, from a decision-
theoretical tradition argues against the ethical considerations when, that is his point, 
much of the questions are better situated in an economic context, in this case an 
economy of credibility. Between two so different poles of argumentation, Miranda 
Fricker’s position deeps into the social and ethical character of testimony. 
 Dependence seems to be the central notion within an epistemology of testimony 
that wants to be sensitive to all these constraints. No genuine testimony without the 
recognition of epistemic situations of dependence. One could even argue that at least 
part of the value of the epistemic achievement the testimonial act consists in derives 
from the very fact that autonomous agents view each other as inter-dependent. This is 
the main argument in the paper by Jesús Vega (“Epistemic merit, autonomy and testi-
mony”). The epistemic conditions of autonomy and dependence do not exclude each 
other, once we distinguish between autonomy and the invididualist ideal of self-
sufficiency. Vega’s paper argues for the attribution of epistemic merit to the respective 
contributions of speaker and hearer, insofar as both of them are engaged in a coopera-
tive task as genuine agents. The core of our epistemic agency in social settings requires 
the exercise of our epistemic autonomy under conditions of mutual dependence. The 
hearer is not deprived of obligations and responsibilities, even if these cannot be 
modelled in terms of evidential reasons and evaluations of reliability of the sources. 
He has to view himself as engaged in a cooperative situation in which he claims of the 
speaker certain commitments and corresponding responsibilities. So testimony is 
deeply entrenched in our personal and social epistemic life.∗ 
 
                                                     
∗ The papers collected in this volume were presented in a meeting held in Madrid in December 2006 in 
the framework of two research projects funded by Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (MEC) 
(BF2003-04372 2003-6; HUM-2006-03221). We thank all the participants for rich and very helpful 
discussions during the meeting. The papers have been modified and updated for their publication. 
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